Denying Services to Prevent Regret by Gerver, Mollie
 1
 
 
Denying Services to Prevent Regret 
 
Mollie Gerver 
 
 
 
Governmental and non-governmental organizations often provide services intended 
to give recipients options they otherwise would not have. A hospital may provide 
patients the option of receiving a treatment; a football club may provide athletes the 
option of joining a team; a humanitarian organization may provide refugees the 
option of repatriating home. Sometimes, the majority of individuals who accept a 
service later regret their decision. A hospital may find that most patients regret 
accepting a given treatment because of its side effects. An American football club 
may learn that most athletes regret joining due to head injuries. An organization may 
learn that most refugees regret repatriating because of violence in their home states. 
In these cases and many more, it may be possible to predict that future recipients of a 
service will feel similar regret. It is unclear if this regret is a reason to discontinue the 
service. 
  
For an actual example of such regret, consider a case from 2012, when a young South 
Sudanese refugee named Mol was detained by Israeli immigration authorities. 
Hoping to be free from detention, he asked an NGO for help repatriating to South 
Sudan. The NGO agreed to help, first warning him that the vast majority of past 
refugees regretted returning, feeling that detention in Israel was preferable to life in 
South Sudan. He listened to their warning, but still wished to return, feeling the risks 
preferable to a life without freedom. The NGO paid for his flight and, shortly after 
landing in Juba, he was displaced to an IDP camp without reliable doctors, hygienic 
latrines, or food security.  Today he prefers the detention he faced in Israel to the 
insecurity he faces in South Sudan. 
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Should the NGO have helped Mol repatriate, knowing his regret was likely? More 
generally, is future regret a reason to deny a service? 
  
When I write ‘reason’ I refer to a fact that gives Agent A a normative pro tanto 
reason to deny a service to Agent B. When I write ‘service’ I refer mainly to an 
irreversible service provided by A to B involving resources, actions, or opportunities, 
and when I write ‘Agent A’ I refer to an agent striving to ensure individuals have a 
broader range of options. Some options needn't improve welfare. When NGOs help 
refugees repatriate, they often provide all refugees the option of repatriating, rather 
than selecting those who would most benefit from returning to their countries of 
origin. 
  
If governments and NGOs are providing services to enhance options, we might 
suppose they should provide these services regardless of future regret. If they warn 
recipients of the risks of accepting their services – including the risks of future regret 
– then recipients are giving their informed consent, and their consent ought to be 
respected. 
  
In this article I reject this claim: There is a good reason to deny a service to prevent 
regret even if the purpose of providing a service is to enhance a recipient’s range of 
options.  
 
In defending this claim, I have a certain type of regret in mind. Regret, as I define it, 
is the feeling that one no longer endorses one's earlier choice because one feels the 
outcome of this choice is less preferable than what would have occurred had one 
chosen otherwise. We can predict such regret as likely when the vast majority of past 
recipients of a service regret their choice, and there is reason to believe this regret 
will likely arise in the future.  
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In the following Section 1 I defend the importance of regret by appealing to the 
importance of preference-fulfillment: we have reason to help individuals fulfill their 
preferences and, if an individual will be unable to fulfill their preferences later as a 
result of a service now, we have reason to deny the service now. I respond to the 
objection that, when denying someone a service they will likely regret, this is 
justified for reasons other than regret: Mol would likely be displaced had he 
returned, and this was reason enough to deny him repatriation. I demonstrate that 
we often have reason to deny a service to prevent regret itself, even when the regret 
is a response to reductions in welfare, freedom, or security. 
 
In Section 2 I argue that, though there is one reason to deny a service to prevent 
regret, this reason is not always weighty. Its weightiness depends on whether certain 
properties are present.  One important property is the extent that the regret is all-
things-considered. Such regret arises when an individual feels that the best life she 
can live from a service is worse than the worst life she could have lived had she 
rejected the service. Another relevant property is the extent that an individual is 
accepting an epistemically transformative service, where she cannot understand the 
nature of service until it has already been accepted.  
 
Before I begin, some clarifications are in order. When discussing services that 
individuals will likely regret, I limit my analysis to cases where individuals 
experience no coercion from the service provider, and are informed about the risks 
from the service provider. I put aside cases of forced interventions to prevent future 
regret, or regret arising from misinformation. Recipients, in all of my examples, are 
warned of the risks, including the risks of regretting their choices.  
  
Why would an individual make a choice they know they will likely regret? One 
reason is that the potential pay-offs are substantial, as with the lottery. Another 
reason is that recipients cannot quite imagine what it would feel like experiencing 
this regret, and so take the plunge, later wishing they had not. Individuals may also 
accept services that take an extended amount of time such that, for every day that 
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lapses, accepting the service is rational and regret unlikely. I might accept a box of 
chocolates everyday, because one box on one day will have minimal harm, and give 
me joy as I bite into each praline, until I later suffer from health complications, 
regretting my accumulative decisions. 1  
  
Finally, a person may accept a service they know they will regret if, at the time they 
make a decision, they have certain preferences that give them reason to accept the 
service, even though they know their preferences will later change. I might accept 
tequila at 8:00pm, knowing I will regret it tomorrow, because as 8:00pm I prefer 
drinking tequila and regretting it tomorrow to not drinking tequila and feeling no 
regret tomorrow. Tomorrow, of course, I will feel differently. It is perhaps unclear if 
my accepting the tequila is rational, or whether feeling regret tomorrow is rational.2 
Regardless, we do make such decisions and feel such regret. It is unclear when others 
should deny us services to prevent this regret from transpiring. 
  
As noted above, my focus is primarily on voluntary services. Though I focus on 
voluntary services, I assume that a recipient can give their voluntary consent even if 
coerced by a third party into their decision, so long as they are not coerced by the 
agent providing them the service. Mol was coerced by the Israeli government into 
repatriating, as the government would detain him if he stayed, but I assume his 
consent to repatriate was valid for the NGO, because the NGO was doing no 
coercing itself and he preferred repatriating to remaining.3 He nonetheless also made 
a decision he would likely regret and it is not clear what the moral status of this 
regret was.  
  
Some might suppose that, because Mol was choosing between two objectionable 
options, he did not truly regret his choice. He only regretted the state of affairs in 
Israel where he was forced to choose between detention and unsafe repatriation. 
  
While it is true he regretted the state of affairs in Israel where he had only two 
choices, he also regretted the one choice he did make.4 More generally, one can regret 
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a state of affairs and the choice made within this state of affairs. A patient diagnosed 
with cancer can later regret having had to choose between death and life-extending 
treatment, while still regretting accepting the life-extending treatment because of its 
painful side effects. This regret for a single choice is important: In many tragic or 
unjust scenarios, third parties must decide whether to offer an additional 
objectionable choice, likely to be regretted, or do nothing at all, constraining choices 
now. 
 
1. Regret as a reason to deny a service 
I propose the following claim: If a service-provider can predict that an individual will 
regret accepting a service, and feel no or less regret if they reject the service, preventing regret 
is one reason to deny the service. 
 
My claim can be derived from two broad values. First, there is a general value, all 
else being equal, in helping individuals live lives they prefer living. If an individual 
will later regret their decision to accept a service, and this regret will extend into the 
remainder of their lives, then we can help them live the life they prefer by denying 
the service. It is true that future preferences are difficult to establish. But when 
predictions of future regret are strong, this future regret can provide one reason to 
deny the service, at times taking priority over current preferences.   
 
There is a second value that underpins my general claim, related to control. In 
general, if a person lacks control over their past decisions, it is better that they are 
satisfied with their past decisions. Imagine that on October 1st I accept surgery for 
the afternoon of October 10th, and on the morning of the 10th I suffer from locked-in 
syndrome, unable to communicate whether I still wish to receive the surgery. If I still 
wish to receive the surgery, and do receive the surgery, it seems that no harm is 
done: I gave my consent on October 1st, and still prefer to have the surgery. In 
contrast, if I wake up on the 10th and am locked-in, and change my mind about the 
surgery, it seems that a significant harm occurs as the surgeon inserts the scalpel into 
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my body.  Lacking control when my preferences have changed is more disturbing 
than lacking control when my preferences have not.  
 
When an individual makes an irreversible decision, they are not locked-in, but they 
do they lack control over this earlier decision, given that they cannot change the past. 
All else being equal, it is better if this person has not changed their mind about their 
past decision, given that they cannot control this past decision.  If we know ahead of 
time that a person will likely change their mind about their past decision, and so 
regret their decision, we have one reason to deny them a service which makes this 
decision possible.  
 
The above value I describe, related to control, may be derived from a broader value 
of autonomy. Autonomy is a contentious term, and some senses of the term are 
unrelated to regret, as when we claim someone’s choice is autonomous if it results 
from preferences she endorses at the time the choice is made.5 But there is another 
sense of autonomy, focusing not on individual choices but on one’s life as a whole.  
One’s life is autonomous if one feels a sense of ownership over this life.  A person can 
feel ownership when their past choices fulfil preferences or commitments they hold 
today. 6 For this reason a patient can feel autonomous if she consents to surgery, is 
disappointed by the results, but still prefers these results to the alternative. In 
contrast, if her preferences change, she is not only disappointed or saddened by the 
life she must endure, but alienated from it, because she no longer identifies with the 
choice leading to this life.7  If we feel such alienation is morally undesirable, then we 
have reason to prevent it from arising.  
 
If we have reason to deny services that lead to likely regret, we have a good reason to 
predict if regret is likely. One mechanism for predicting is to compare those who 
accept an intervention and those who do not. If the vast majority who accept an 
intervention regret their choice, but those who reject the intervention do not, and 
future potential recipients hold similar characteristics to past recipients, this is 
evidence that regret will be widespread amongst future recipients.  
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Of course, this alone will not demonstrate that there is a causal relationship between 
the service and the regret. It may be that those accepting the service are more prone 
to feelings of regret for reasons unrelated to the service.  It would therefore help to 
supplement this evidence with Random Control Trials (RCTs). Today, limited RCTs 
have tested the extent that patients are likely to feel regret after the first year of a 
medical intervention, 8  and more long-term RCTs might be administered.  If the vast 
majority of patients who are randomly given treatment regret their decision to accept 
treatment, but those randomly denied treatment do not wish they had received this 
treatment, then this is strong evidence that the treatment contributes to regret, 
creating one reason to deny the treatment to future patients. Similarly, RCTs can also 
determine whether the majority in certain sub-groups regret their decision to accept 
a service, even if the majority of all recipients do not. We might learn, for example, 
that the majority of individuals who are younger than twenty-five and suffering 
from migraines regret a given medical intervention, even if the majority of all 
recipients do not. Under some conditions, we may be able to use this data to predict 
that future recipients who are under twenty-five and suffering from migraines are 
likely to feel similar regret.  
 
The above claim is relatively modest. It does not establish when regret is a very 
weighty reason to deny a service, a question I shall address in the next section. The 
claim is merely that future regret is one reason to deny a service, to be weighed 
against countervailing considerations. This modest claim has nonetheless faced a 
number of objections.  
 
1.1 Other Reasons Objection 
I first I call the Other Reasons Objection. In cases where a person feels regret, we might 
suppose they are feeling regret about some change in their life, whether it be a 
reduction in welfare, freedom, or happiness.  It is these facts that give reasons to 
deny the service, with regret creating no additional reason. 
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There are three versions of this objection. The first draws upon the principle of 
autonomy. In general, one condition for autonomy is that one has sufficient welfare 
and an adequate range of options.9 It is wrong, therefore, to provide services that 
significantly reduce welfare or the number of options.10 In cases where we intuitively 
feel that regret is a reason to deny a service, our intuitions are responding to the 
reduction in welfare or options, and not to the regret felt.  
 
In some cases, this reasoning may hold.  But in cases where a person's welfare or 
range of options will be constrained regardless of whether they accept a service, 
regret may remain a deciding factor. Mol was choosing between detention in Israel, 
where he could not travel more than a mile, or returning to South Sudan, where he 
could travel but would be risking his life. In such a case, his future regret tips the 
balance against helping with his return, creating a reason that would otherwise not 
exist.  
 
Some may insist that, in the case of Mol, staying in Israel really would protect his 
options and welfare compared to repatriating, and so this was reason enough to 
deny his return, regardless of regret. Even if one accepts this conclusion for Mol, 
there are tens of thousands of other refugees who live in insecurity and poverty in 
countries of asylum, forced to remain in refugee camps, and who choose to repatriate 
to countries of origin with roughly the same levels of insecurity and poverty.11 For 
these refugees, given the similar conditions in both host and home country, we 
cannot claim that reductions in welfare and options explain why return is wrong. If 
we feel return assistance is wrong when regret is likely in such cases, it seems the 
regret itself explains this intuition. 
 
There is a second variety of the Other Reasons Objection.  Some might claim that, 
though there is reason to deny a service when regret is likely, the regret is not an 
independent reason to deny a service. When individuals feel regret, they regret 
something that has happened, such as losing their freedom, or security, or subjective 
happiness.12 Regret is just the additional psychological response to such outcomes, 
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rather than an independent consideration. To establish if regret is an independent 
consideration, some might claim, we must consider cases where there is regret 
without any of the painful outcomes that tend to be associated with regret. In other 
words, a truly interesting thesis on regret would pull apart regret from other 
considerations, and this is only possible when considering cases where a person feels 
regret despite their life going better, such as a refugee who regrets repatriating 
despite their security and income improving, or an athlete who regrets joining a team 
despite facing no permanent injury and having improved health. If we imagine such 
cases, we would unlikely be convinced that regret is a reason to deny a service, given 
that the lives of the relevant agents have improved.  
 
I do not believe, however, that we can only establish if regret creates a reason to deny 
a service by isolating it from other properties, such as welfare harms. This is because, 
more generally, I do not believe we can only establish if a property creates a reason 
for action by isolating it from other properties. A property can constitute a reason in 
itself even if only arising when interacting with other properties. For example, if 
Katy needs a pen, this is a reason to lend her my pen, even if this reason is contingent 
on other properties, such my pen working, her wanting to borrow my pen, and her 
lacking another pen.13 Regret is similarly an independent reason to deny a service, 
even if contingent on the presence of other properties, such as welfare reductions. 
 
If this is true, then to prove regret is a reason separate from these welfare reductions, 
I needn't isolate regret from these welfare reductions; it is enough to isolate these 
welfare reductions from regret. This is possible by comparing pairs of cases where 
welfare is identical for two individuals, and regret is present for one individual and 
not the other. If we compare two athletes, two refugees, and two patients, and the 
first of each pair will experience both regret and a welfare reduction after a service, 
and the second will experience no regret but the same welfare reduction after the 
service, it seems we have reason to deny the service to the first and not the second. If 
one refugee returning to South Sudan will experience insecurity, lack of water, and 
regret, while another refugee is returning to this same insecurity and lack of water 
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but will feel no regret, then it seems the NGO has more reason to deny repatriation 
to the first refugee than the second. Regret is a distinct reason to deny a service, even 
if it is contingent on the existence of other properties.  
 
There is a final version of the Other Reasons Objection, derived from an argument by 
Krister Bykvist. We are often faced with choices, Bykvist notes, that we know we will 
regret, but which we also know will make us happier. Imagine I have a choice to 
either stay single or get married. If I stay single, I will be happy, but will regret my 
choice, feeling marriage was preferable. If I marry, I will be miserable, but not regret 
my choice, still feeling marriage was preferable. It seems that the future regret I will 
feel as a single person is not a good reason to marry, because I will be more 
miserable as a married person. Instead, Bykvist argues, we ought to consider how 
strongly we will later want our future state of affairs, and not whether we will prefer 
this state affairs to the life we could have lived. If I will be happier as a single person 
I have reason to stay single, even if I will prefer being married and so regret not 
having married. 14  If Bykvist is correct, then we can similarly claim that, when 
providing a service to others, their future attitudes about their circumstances are 
what matter, rather than future attitudes about the life they could have lived had 
they chosen differently.  
 
Bykvist's example is helpful for demonstrating that future regret is often a very poor 
consideration for how we ought to act now. Nonetheless, it does not demonstrate 
that future regret is never a reason at all. It merely demonstrates that, when we will 
be miserable with a choice, this future misery creates a countervailing reason to 
avoid this choice. It remains the case that, when we are faced with two choices with 
equal predicted misery, then future regret is a consideration for how we ought to 
proceed. Similarly, when we can predict that another will feel regret when accepting 
a service, but equally miserable either way, this likely regret is a reason for us to 
deny the service. 
 
1.2 Future Preferences Objection 
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There is as second objection, which I call the Future Preferences Objection. It comes in 
two forms. The first begins with the premise that we have little reason to make 
choices based on our own future preferences. This is because our future preferences 
are not our current preferences, and so what we have reason to want later is not what 
we have reason to want now. This argument is often made by appealing to an 
example from Parfit, involving a fourteen-year-old girl who decides to conceive, 
even though she is extremely ill-prepared to do so. She knows that, once her child is 
born, she will love her child, and feel it is preferable the child was born. The child, of 
course, will feel this as well.15 Neither will regret the decision, but she should still not 
conceive at such a young age. This is because, though she will later have reasons to 
affirm her past decisions, these reasons arise from an attachment to her child, and 
she did not have this attachment prior to conceiving.16 If future preferences for past 
actions are poor reasons for these actions at the current time, we should not deny 
services to others based solely on predicting their future preferences. 
 
One potential response to this objection is to reject the claim that the fourteen-year-
old has no reason to conceive. She does, given her future affirmation about giving 
birth, but has stronger additional reasons to not conceive: It is better to create a 
world with children raised by mature parents, able to provide sufficient resources 
and care.17 But even if one believes that the fourteen year old has no reason at all to 
conceive, despite her future preferences, it can still be the case that future regret 
gives her an additional reason to not conceive. This is because, even if one's future 
affirmation for past actions is irrelevant for how one acts at the current time, future 
regret may remain relevant for how one ought not act at the current time. Imagine an 
adult who, unlike the fourteen-year-old girl, knows she will regret having the child 
because she will secretly not love her child, and miss her old life of reckless 
adventure.18 Even if this adult will be an excellent parent, and the child will never 
learn of this regret, it seems the likely regret is a strong additional reason for her not 
to conceive.19 
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There is a second version of the Future Preferences Objection. We might suppose that 
there is value in having control over one’s life. One is in control even if one's 
preferences change, and even if this change leads to subsequent regret. 20  If an 
eighteen-year-old makes a choice that impacts her life at thirty, such as getting a 
tattoo, she can still have control, so long as her preferences and choices at eighteen 
are made with full capacity and information.  
 
Even if there is value in having control at one point in time, control at one point can 
limit control at another. When this occurs, then it is important to ensure that, during 
the period of limited control, regret is minimized. Imagine an eighteen-year-old 
consents to a full-body tattoo she cannot easily remove. She has control when 
accepting the tattoo, but her control is limited as a result, given that she cannot 
change her earlier choice. In such a scenario, it seems her likely regret is one relevant 
consideration for whether the tattoo parlour ought to provide her the tattoo. This 
reason may not always be very weighty – an issue I shall address in Section 2 – but it 
is a reason nonetheless.  
 
1.3 Implications Objection 
There is a third objection to my claim, the Implications Objection. If it were true that 
we ought to ever deny services to prevent regret, because this fulfils individuals’ 
future preferences, this implies we ought to sometimes force individuals to accept 
services to prevent regret, because this fulfils individuals’ future preferences. But this 
seems unacceptably paternalistic. 21 It would seem wrong to force a patient to accept 
surgery even if they will later prefer having had surgery.  
  
There are two responses to this objection.  
 
The first begins with a premise:  Committing an act that constrains another's options 
requires a weightier justification than omitting an act that constrains another's 
options. Tying a person to a chair requires a weightier justification than failing to 
help a person stand up from a chair. If one accepts this distinction between omissions 
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and commissions, then it follows that forcing a person to accept a service requires a 
weightier justification than denying a person a service. If this is true, then the 
justification for denying a service may be insufficient for forcing someone to accept a 
service. If this is true, then claiming we should deny a service to prevent regret 
needn't imply we should force someone to accept a service to prevent regret.  
 
Some might reject the above explanation, arguing that there is no morally relevant 
distinction between committing an act and omitting an act.22 Some may also feel that, 
if an agent has a history of providing a service, and suddenly withdraws the service, 
then this withdrawal is more similar to committing an act, comparable to tying a 
person to a chair. If one holds either of these views, there is a second response to the 
Implications Objection.  
 
In general, there is a distinction between our reasons for providing services and our 
reasons for not providing services. If a surgeon is providing surgery, or an NGO is 
providing repatriation, their central reasons for providing the surgery or repatriation 
are that the recipients wish to accept these services. In contrast, surgeons and NGOs 
have many reasons for not providing surgery or repatriation; namely, they could 
engage in other activities instead, such as reading a book, dancing a jig, or helping 
other vulnerable populations in need. As such, their reasons for denying a service 
needn't be as substantial; they have plenty of other reasons already. As such, 
preventing regret may be a decisive reason to deny a service when combined with 
these other reasons. These other reasons are not present when forcing someone to 
accept the service. It is therefore wrong to force someone to accept a service merely 
to prevent regret.23 Therefore, claiming that we have reason to deny a service to 
prevent regret needn't imply that we should force someone to accept a service to 
prevent regret. 
 
There is a second version of the Implications Objection. If the reason future regret 
matters is that a person's future preferences matter, this implies that we have less 
reason to deny a service to someone who will develop adaptive preferences. If the 
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NGO learned that past refugees persuaded themselves that life was fine to avoid the 
frustration of regret, the NGO would have one less reason to deny repatriation. 
Similarly, if there were a magical pill that a recipient could swallow to rid herself of 
the regret, then we would have one less reason to deny a service.  
 
This is not entirely an odd conclusion. We often think it preferable to help an 
individual take a high-risk choice if their preferences are fairly stable, such that they 
will not change their mind at a later point time. This is true even if their preferences 
are stable because they adapt their preferences to their surroundings, or use various 
tools – such as exercise or meditation – which encourage them to maintain their 
preferences across time. If we know that an individual lacks the psychological 
disposition to keep their preferences stable, or lacks the tools to do so, it is not odd to 
claim there is one more reason to deny them a service they will likely regret. Indeed, 
this is the approach that many organisations already take. In 2004 shortly before 
joining the military a recruitment officer asked me a series of questions intended to 
gauge whether my current preferences to enlist would likely remain stable across 
time. In testing my dispositions, the officer accounted not only for my natural 
dispositions, but whether I was likely to take actions – such as exercise and 
meditation – that would ensure my preferences did not dramatically change. Of 
course, the reason the recruitment officer wished to ensure I would not regret my 
choice was because she wanted to ensure I would be a reliable soldier, rather than 
because she cared about preventing regret for my own sake. But it is not implausible 
to imagine a similar system intended to predict regret for the individual’s own sake.  
 
Importantly, one may accept this reasoning without holding that adaptive 
preferences or magic pills make a harmful service right. If an individual is living a 
safe life, we should often deny a service that will endanger their life even if the 
person will learn to prefer this dangerous life because she has no other choice. I am 
merely claiming that, if regret is likely, this future regret is an additional reason to 
deny a service, a reason that does not arise if an individual learns to adapt their 
preferences.  
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2. Regret as a weighty reason 
Though regret is one reason to deny a service, it is not necessarily a very weighty 
reason, to be adopted into the policies of organisations and states.  The extent that 
regret is a weighty reason will depend on the extent that certain properties are 
present.   
 
2.1 Time 
The first property is related to time.  The longer an individual will likely feel regret, 
the greater reason there is to deny the service to prevent this regret. For example, 
certain medical interventions have led to relatively long-term regret, with patients 
still wishing they had never accepted an intervention a year later, and the regret 
increasing over the course of the year.24 Further follow-up studies may find that 
these patients continue to feel regret for years to come. Certain repatriation programs 
have led to similar long-term regret, such as when the majority of refugees 
repatriating to Baghdad from neighbouring countries regretted their decision years 
later.25  
 
The most extreme case will involve individuals feeling regret for their rest of their 
lives. While this may seem rare, it is not so rare if we acknowledge that, even if an 
individual will likely feel regret, they needn’t necessarily feel distress. A person may 
feel that the life they could have lived would be preferable to the life they live now, 
but also feel quite happy in general, learning to cope with meditation, music, and 
spending time with friends. Just as a person who has experienced an involuntary 
medical intervention needn’t feel distress the rest of their lives, even if they prefer to 
have not had the intervention, a person who feels regret needn’t necessarily feel 
distress the rest of their lives, even if they prefer to have chosen differently.  
 
2.2 The regret is all-things-considered 
The second relevant property is that the regret is ‘all-things-considered.’ For an agent 
to know she feels all-things-considered regret, she would need to consider all life 
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events that resulted from her decision and compare these to all events that would 
have happened, had she decided differently. She would then need to conclude that 
the life she would live was preferable to the life she was living.26  Imagine, for 
example, that a woman stated that she regretted having an abortion.  For a woman to 
truly know she felt such regret, she would need to consider all life events that 
resulted from the abortion, such as the job she obtained and the relationships she 
built, and compare these to every event that would have happened had she decided 
differently, such as the job she would not obtain and the relationships she would not 
build. If a woman chooses to have an abortion, she usually cannot know if the life 
she is living now would be very similar or different to the life she would live had she 
decided differently. Without knowing how life would be different, she would 
struggle to know if she regretted her choice. If a woman rarely knows if she regrets 
her past choice, then it is usually wrong for others to deny her a choice based on 
future regret. 
 
Though it is difficult to know if one feels all-things-considered regret, it is still 
possible to be fairly certain that one feels all-things-considered regret. In rare cases, a 
person is fairly certain that nearly all possible lives they could have lived, had they 
chosen differently, would have been preferable to the most preferable life they can 
live now as a result of the choice they made. For Mol and others repatriating to South 
Sudan, there is some evidence this was the case. Of those I interviewed, nearly all 
considered the very worst life they could have in Israel, including in detention, and 
felt this would have been better than the best life they could now obtain in South 
Sudan.27 They felt that the food and medical care they would have obtained in Israel 
were more valuable than the freedom they gained from returning.  
 
Now, in reality, recipients of services will never feel that the best life they can live is 
certainly worse than the worst life they would have lived without the service. There 
is always a possibility that tragedy will strike after rejecting a service. In Mol’s case, 
there was always a possibility that in Israel he would have been deported, killed, or 
died of natural causes, and so the worst possible life in not repatriating would not 
 17
have been better than the best life from repatriating. There is also the possibility that 
Mol, now that he has repatriated, will later find refuge in another country. He will no 
longer feel the best life he can live is worse than the worst life he could have lived in 
Israel. Moreover, even if he does not find refuge, he may adapt his preferences to his 
environment, and prefer the life he has to the life he could have had in Israel.  
 
To account for this possibility, we can view this property as scalar: the greater 
recipients will feel that the best life with the service is worse than the worst life 
without the service, the greater reason to deny the service. Imagine that we can 
predict that Mol will feel, after returning, that the best life after repatriation must 
involve resettlement to a safer country, and all other outcomes are worse than the 
worst life in Israel. If he will also feel there is only a 1% chance of obtaining 
resettlement, there would be a weightier reason to deny repatriation than if he will 
feel there is a 2% chance he will obtain resettlement.28 Conversely, imagine that after 
returning Mol will feel, looking back at his life in Israel, that there was a 1% chance 
of either dying in the near future or being deported had he remained in Israel,29 and 
dying or deportation in Israel are worse than the best possible outcome in South 
Sudan. If this feeling could be predicted ahead of time, there would be a weightier 
reason to deny repatriation than if he will later perceive a 2% chance of dying or 
being deported had he remained in Israel. 
 
Note that the relevant property above is not the actual probabilities of certain 
outcomes occurring, but the probabilities recipients will perceive after accepting the 
service. We might imagine Mol thinking, after returning, that he has a 2% chance of 
being resettled when he has in fact a 10% chance of being resettled. His level of regret 
is based on a false belief of the odds of his life becoming better. We ought to care 
about such regret arising from false beliefs. This is because we ought to care about 
preferences based on false beliefs, assuming the service provider has disclosed all 
known risks. Imagine a doctor warns a patient that the risks of paralysis from 
surgery are 20%, but the patient does not trust doctors and so suspects there is a 60% 
chance of paralysis from the surgery. If the patient prefers no surgery as a result, the 
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doctor ought to respect her preferences, especially if she would consistently hold 
these preferences after the surgery is complete. If preventing regret matters because 
respecting preferences matters, then preventing regret matters even when it is the 
result of inaccurate beliefs.  
 
2.3 Greater all-things-considered regret at accepting the service 
In some cases individuals will likely feel all-things-considered regret if they accept a 
service, but would have felt the same regret had they rejected the service. When 
individuals will feel the same regret regardless of whether they accept a service, 
there would be no regret-related reason to deny the service. Though denying the 
service would prevent regret – if individuals are denied a service, they cannot regret 
a choice because they have no choice – they will still feel that the best life they can 
live now is worse than the worst life they would have lived, had they access to the 
service. They will remain in a state where they lack control and their preferences are 
not met, failing to promote the value of preference-fulfilment described in the 
previous section. Regret is therefore a weightier reason to deny a service when the 
all-things-considered regret in accepting the service is greater than the all-things-
considered regret in rejecting the service. 
 
2.4 Epistemic transformation 
Even if the above three properties are present, there is still a reason we might 
suppose individuals should be provided the service: they have given their informed 
consent. If individuals give their informed consent to accept the service, the service 
gives them control over their lives, and there is value in giving individuals such 
control. Of course, this value needn’t be absolute, because if they are provided the 
service their control will be reduced later on, when they are forced to live with the 
consequences of their decision. But we might nonetheless put some value on control 
at the time of the service, given that their later reduction in control was the result of 
the their own earlier choice.  
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If we value individuals having control over their lives, and individuals have control 
when giving informed consent to a service, there is a fourth relevant property: regret 
is a weightier reason to deny a service the less individuals can give informed 
consent. A recipient is less able to give informed consent if she is not warned about 
risks. Even if she is warned of risks, she may be unable to understand their nature. 
Such is the case with services that are ‘epistemically transformative.’30  
 
According to L.A. Paul, an epistemically transformative experience arises if one 
gains knowledge that would be impossible to gain without the experience. All 
experiences are epistemically transformative to an extent. The apple I ate this 
morning tasted slightly different than other apples I have eaten, and so I could not 
have known ahead of time the taste of the apple. Some choices are slightly more 
transformative, such as eating a durian fruit for the first time. Some choices are so 
transformative that a dominant element of one’s life will change, and this change is 
both impossible to understand prior to the choice, and crucial to understand to 
establish one’s preferences.31 A woman who has seen only black and white, and is 
deciding whether to experience the colour red, is faced with such a choice,32 as is a 
teenager deciding whether to enlist, a deaf individual deciding whether to gain 
hearing, and a potential parent deciding whether to have children. In such cases, the 
teenager, deaf individual, and potential parent cannot establish whether they prefer 
enlisting, hearing, and having children unless they understand what it is like to 
enlist, hear, and have children, but they cannot understand what these experiences 
are like until they experience them first-hand. They are therefore faced with an 
insurmountable information-constraint. 33  Though they cannot make an entirely 
informed choice, they can consider how much they value new experiences and 
discoveries for their own sake, as distinct from the subjective goodness or badness of 
the outcomes. Because each person values new experiences to a different degree, 
only each person can decide what she ought to do.34 
 
Based on the above analysis, governments and organisations should generally not 
deny services based on their epistemically transformative character. While recipients 
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of the services are unable to entirely comprehend the decisions they are about to 
make, they are able to decide whether they are willing to accept a decision whose 
meaning they cannot comprehend.  
 
Nonetheless, a special reason to deny such services arises if regret is likely. 
 
If individuals will likely regret a choice, they will later fail to live the life they want to 
live, and will be unable to change their earlier decisions. Given this likely outcome, 
we have reasons to ensure recipients are especially well-informed about the choices 
they are about to make. Being especially well-informed is impossible for services that 
are especially epistemically transformative, as they will change a dominant element 
of one’s life in a manner impossible to comprehend ahead of time. This creates one 
reason to deny the service likely to be regretted, a reason that would not exist with 
epistemically transformative services unlikely to be regretted, or with services likely 
to be regretted that were not epistemically transformative.35  
 
Mol's choice to repatriate was epistemically transformative. Though he was informed 
about malnutrition in South Sudan prior to this return, and informed of widespread 
racism against Nuer citizens in Juba, he struggled to comprehend the meaning of 
such malnutrition and racism until actually experiencing these phenomena. This is 
because he had last lived in South Sudan as very young boy, and had access to food 
and security as a young boy, having moved to Khartoum before violence reached his 
village. Similar regret was common amongst others repatriating. They were told 
about the facts of life in South Sudan – such as the lack of clean water and 
widespread persecution – but struggled to understand the meaning of living without 
water and with persecution, having lived outside South Sudan their entire lives. 
When individuals take a plunge into a life that includes elements impossible to 
understand, and understanding these elements is crucial for establishing one’s 
preferences, they struggle to give truly informed consent. Because truly informed 
consent is necessary for choices involving all-things-considered regret, there is a 
weightier reason to deny epistemically transformative services likely to be regretted.  
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Not all cases of refugee repatriation are epistemically transformative. When refugees 
are returning to a country they have lived in recently, or for an extensive period of 
time, they may be returning to conditions which they have experienced in the past, 
and so the experience will not be transformative. But such cases are increasingly rare. 
Refugees returning from Kenya to Somalia, from Uganda to Rwanda, and from Iran 
to Afghanistan are often returning to countries they have never lived in at all, at least 
not as adults.36 Given that a truly informed return is impossible to obtain, the high 
degree of regret may be a decisive reason to deny repatriation.   
 
This is consistent with the claim that a high degree of regret could also be a decisive 
reason to deny a service that is not epistemically transformative. Even when 
recipients are able to understand what it is they are accepting, and so able to control 
their lives, providing the service will also undermine control in the future, given that 
individuals will be forced to live with their decision. When the future undermining 
of control entails a detrimental blow to preference-fulfilment, this itself my justify 
denying the service. My point is simply that, when a service is epistemically 
transformative, we cannot even claim the service provides an individual a high 
degree of control at the time she accepts the service, given that she cannot give her 
informed consent if the service is epistemically transformative. In cases where the 
other three properties are not quite so pronounced – such as a refugee who will feel 
regret for a decade but not her whole life – the epistemically transformative nature of 
the service may be the tipping point in justifying its denial. 
 
2.5 Transformative rejections 
Some recipients will regret an epistemically transformative service but would have 
felt the same regret from an equally transformative rejection. Refugees who reject 
repatriation may find themselves in detention for the first time, an experience whose 
meaning they cannot comprehend beforehand, and they may feel similar all-things-
considered regret as if they accepted repatriation.  
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To account for the potential ways that rejecting a service can be transformative, we 
ought to add a fifth relevant property: those who reject the service will either 
unlikely feel all-things-considered regret or, if they do, they will unlikely feel their 
decision was epistemically transformative. Were we to learn that both accepting and 
rejecting the service were similarly regretful and transformative, we could not claim 
that regret justified denying the service; denying the service would not prevent 
individuals from being in a position where they cannot understand a decision they 
will later regret.  
 
In contrast, when individuals accepting and rejecting the service feel similar all-
things-considered regret, but only one group is accepting an option that is 
epistemically transformative, there would be greater reason to deny the option that is 
transformative. This might occur if refugees are choosing between detention they 
have already experienced for some time, and a life in a country of origin they have 
never experienced before. If regret is likely for both choices, but only the second 
choice is transformative, only the second choice is not fully informed. There would 
be a weightier reason to deny repatriation than in a scenario where both choices were 
equally transformative, or in a scenario where only remaining was transformative. 
The latter might occur if refugees have lived in their country of origin recently, but 
will experience detention for the first time if they remain. In such a scenario, only 
remaining is transformative, and so only remaining is not fully informed. There 
would be a less weighty reason to deny repatriation to prevent regret.    
 
2.6 Causal explanation 
The final property relates to causal explanation. The more the service explains the 
regret, the weightier the reason to deny the service to prevent regret. In cases where 
the recipient will likely feel regret because of the service alone, and this regret is not 
dependent on additional choices made prior to or after the service, there is a 
weightier reason to deny the service.  
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There is some evidence that Mol’s all-things-considered regret was largely explained 
by the repatriation he accepted. Before he returned to South Sudan, while still living 
in Israel, he could not apply for refugee status, and so was forced to work on the 
black market, and then forced to face detention. He had only two choices: live a life 
in detention, or repatriate. When he returned, his only source of funds was the 
money he returned with, his only option of employment was to open a food stall in a 
market, and the only place he could live was Juba, as he would have struggled to 
find sufficient customers in secondary towns. He was then forced to flee to an IDP 
camp. In a life of few choices, repatriation was the only choice that resulted in the 
outcome of all-things-considered regret. And it is this choice alone that was made 
possible by the NGO. As such, he received help to make a choice that was largely 
responsible for the all-things-considered regret he felt.  
 
This is not always the case with repatriation. Unlike Mol, some refugees can apply 
for refugee status, but choose not to. Had they applied, and gained refugee status, 
they would have gained residency and possibly citizenship. Had they gained 
citizenship, they could have left and re-entered the safe host country fairly easily. 
Had they repatriated after this, their repatriation would be reversible, and less likely 
to be regretted. If in reality they chose to not apply for refugee status and also chose 
to repatriate, their all-things-considered regret would be from a series of choices, and 
not just repatriation. Helping with repatriation in such cases is less problematic. 
Repatriation would be only one of many choices that, in combination, led to the 
regret felt. 
 
Some might suppose that this property is rarely ever found. This is because it is rare 
that someone feels regret from a single choice alone, or even from a small number of 
choices. Mol almost certainly made many choices after he repatriated that he 
regretted, and so the regret he experienced would be the result of both repatriation 
and these subsequent choices. For example, if he repatriated, regretted his decision, 
and then opened a small stall in a market which he regretted as well, he would feel 
regret the result of both repatriation and this subsequent decision. Indeed, there will 
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likely be many decisions he makes leading to the feeling that his life could be better 
had he decided differently, and so no one decision will lead to the regret he feels.  
 
Though Mol will likely make other decisions that lead to regret, it is unlikely he will 
make other decisions that lead to regret that is all-things-considered and the result of 
an epistemically transformative experience. This regret is rare, and so if one feels 
such regret from a service, there will likely be an extended period of time where only 
the service explains this regret.  Even if Mol regretted opening a stall in the market, 
he did not feel all-things-considered regret from this decision, where the worst life 
without the stall would have been better than the best life with the stall. If only the 
choice to repatriate entailed such strong regret, and no other choice explains this 
strong sense of regret, then repatriation explains this strong regret.  
 
We might imagine this sixth property present outside the sphere of repatriation. 
Imagine a segment of the population, despite leading the healthiest of lives, is 
diagnosed with cancer, and undergo treatment to extend their lives by two years, 
leading to painful side effects and all-things-considered regret. Imagine they feel 
regret from the particular choice to accept the treatment, never having made another 
choice that contributed to the regret felt. In such cases, the doctor providing the 
treatment would be contributing a great deal to the regret felt, as the regret would 
arise from the treatment alone, and no other prior or subsequent choices. The 
hospital would have a weighty reason to discontinue the treatment, assuming the 
other five properties were met.  
 
Similarly, imagine students regret their choice to enrol in a costly degree program, 
later feeling that their lives would be all-things-considered preferable had they never 
enrolled, and no other choice explains this all-things-considered regret they feel. If 
this regret was epistemically transformative, and they wished the degree had never 
been an option at all, then this would give the university an especially weighty 
reason to discontinue the degree program, or limit it to students less likely to feel 
regret. Finally, imagine athletes are warned about the risks of concussions in joining 
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an American football team, join regardless, and regret their decision throughout their 
lives, feeling constant stress about the possibility they suffered permanent brain 
injuries which will become apparent as they age.37 If these athletes feel regret from 
the particular choice to join the team, and no other prior and subsequent choices, 
then the sports team would have a weighty reason to discontinue their athletic 
program, assuming the other five properties were present.  
 
It is worth noting that, even in cases where regret is an especially weighty reason to 
deny a service, because all of the above six properties are present, there may still be 
competing considerations. When these competing considerations are sufficiently 
weighty, regret may not be a decisive reason to deny the service.   
 
Such may be the case, for example, in policies surrounding contraceptive 
sterilisation. Today, many states deny sterilisation to individuals younger than 
twenty-five,38 as those younger than twenty-five are statistically more likely to regret 
their decision.39 With further research and more fine-grained data, we might be able 
to predict which individuals are accepting an epistemically transformative choice, 
which individuals will likely feel all-things-considered regret, and which individuals 
are likely to feel regret from sterilisation alone. In such cases, though there is a 
weighty reason to deny sterilisation, this reason may not be decisive due to 
competing considerations. One competing consideration is related to reproduction: 
the right to control one’s reproductive organs to not have children may be especially 
weighty, such that preventing regret may be insufficient to override this right.40  
 
In contrast, it seems unlikely that the interests in refugees returning to unsafe 
countries are weighty enough considerations to trump the importance of preventing 
regret, at least when the six properties I described are present. Similarly, athletes’ 
interests in joining a team do not necessarily trump the value of preventing regret, 
and it is not clear that patients’ interests in extending their lives by two years trump 
the value of preventing regret. Whether they do will ultimately require a broader 
discussion, but such a discussion is necessary, precisely because regret matters.  
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2.7 Welfare reductions 
Until now, I have limited my discussion to individuals who will feel regret in 
addition to experiencing reductions in welfare and freedom. When Mol repatriated 
he was forced into an enclosed camp without reliable food and security, and 
regretted his decision for these reasons. I believe that regret also matters when 
welfare or freedom will be improved. Imagine a refugee who repatriates from a 
detention center to Gambella in Ethiopia, never having tasted Ethiopian food or 
Ethiopian espresso, never having lived in a hot tropical climate, never having slept 
under a mosquito net, and never having worked as an interpreter, his profession 
upon arrival. His life is improved according to certain objective criteria – he has more 
food and mobility – yet he regrets his choice nonetheless, a choice leading to a life he 
could not fully understand prior to repatriating. If an NGO could predict that he 
would likely feel this way prior to returning, I believe the NGO would have a reason 
to deny him repatriation. This is because, if regret is likely, we ought to demand a 
higher level of informed consent, impossible to obtain with epistemically 
transformative services.  
 
Some may reject this last claim, and argue that regret is only a weighty reason to 
deny a service if welfare or freedom will be reduced. Moreover, even if regret 
matters when welfare and freedom are improved, it might matter more when either 
are reduced: we might feel more concerned if a refugee feels regret because she is 
displaced and malnourished than if a refugee feels regret but is neither displaced nor 
malnourished. If this is true, then we can add a seventh relevant property: the more 
welfare and freedom will be reduced, the more likely regret is a reason to deny a 
service. It remains the case that regret is a reason distinct from these outcomes. If we 
compared two refugees, two athletes, and two patients, and the first was likely to 
feel regret because her welfare was reduced, and the second was unlikely to feel 
regret despite her welfare being reduced, there would be an additional reason to 
deny repatriation to the first and not the second.  
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3. Conclusion 
When an individual consents to a service, we might provide it, believing it is her 
choice to make. But choices at one time can conflict with preferences at another. We 
have a weighty reason to deny a service when most recipients will likely feel all-
things-considered regret for an extended period of time, and this outcome is the 
result of a single epistemically transformative choice they wish they had never made.  
 
Perhaps the properties I described are rarely present, and so regret is rarely a very 
weighty reason to deny a service. Rarely does any given choice we make explain the 
regret we feel. It is more likely part of a web of complex decision making, with the 
particular choice to accept a service only one property in the ultimate feeling that we 
wish we had chosen otherwise. And rarely can we be confident, after a choice, that 
our lives would be better had we chosen differently. Exploring rare cases of all-
things-considered regret is helpful precisely because they are exceptional, 
emphasizing why regret, as a general rule, is not a particularly good consideration 
for the choices we make, nor a good consideration when fulfilling the choices of 
others. 
 
Though regret is not usually a very important consideration, there remain cases 
where it is, requiring us to re-evaluate when services are provided. Athletes 
engaging in high-risk sports may feel all-things-considered regret about joining a 
team, and dominant aspects of their lives may have been impossible to comprehend 
prior to their choice. Patients undergoing certain treatments may feel similarly, even 
if the treatments help them in other ways. Refugees may later wish they had rejected 
repatriation, even if this meant living in detention. If regret is a relevant 
consideration for how we treat others, then athletes, patients, and refugees should be 
asked if they wish they had never been given a service at all. Most forms of regret 
will not be all-things-considered, and most will be from a series of choices. But some 
forms of regret may be similar to what Mol felt. We should care about such 
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experiences, accounting for the preferences people have later when assisting them 
now. 
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